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CRIMINAL LAW-IN RE MOTION TO

UNSEAL ELECTRONIC SUR

VEILLANCE EVIDENCE. THIRD PARTY ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT
ACQUIRED WIRETAP EVIDENCE

INTRODUCTION

In 1993, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir
cuit considered a challenge to the policy of non-disclosure to pri
vate litigants of government-acquired electronic surveillance
evidence. In In re Motion to Unseal Electronic Surveillance Evi
dence,l the court, in an en banc opinion, decided whether § 2517(3)
of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968 ("Title 111"),2 as amended in 1970, provided for the disclosure
of certain sealed electronic evidence. In particular, the court fo
cused on whether evidence acquired and employed by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") in a criminal action against a de
fendant can be used by private litigants in civil actions brought pur
suant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO"P against the same defendant. 4
Howard J. Smith was involved in several real estate develop
ment transactions with Donn H. Lipton. When the transactions
failed, Smith brought a civil action against Lipton for violating
RICO.s During discovery, Smith sought access to several of Lip
ton's conversations that had been recorded and sealed by the FBI
pursuant to Title III as part of an electronic surveillance of a third .
party's office. 6
Smith filed a motion in federal district court to unseal the tapes
and corresponding transcripts because he believed that they would
support his allegation of RICO violations by Lipton. 7 The district
court interpreted § 2517 of Title III as prohibiting the disclosure of
990 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
2. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 254
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1988».
3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
4. In re Electronic Evidence, 990 F.2d at 1016.
5. Id. (citing Smith v. Lipton, No. 91-643C(1), slip op. at 1 (E.D. Mo. May 7,
1991».
6. Id.
7.. Id.
1.
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such evidence. 8 Accordingly, the court denied Smith's motion.9 In
1992, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that
§ 2517(3) governs the disclosure of intercepted communications,
and that, under limited circumstances, intercepted communications
not previously made public may be made available to private liti
gants.1° In April 1993, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
granted Lipton's petition for a rehearing en banc and vacated the
panel opinion. 11 Thereafter, by a vote of seven to five, the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's opinion
and held that § 2517(3) does not authorize disclosure of previously
undisclosed wiretap evidence to private civil RICO litigants. 12
Moreover, the court held that even if § 2517(3) did authorize disclo
sure to private civil RICO litigants, at no point did it authorize pre
trial disclosure to such persons. 13
This Note will consider the en banc decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in In re Motion to Unseal Electronic
Surveillance Evidence. Part I.A of the Note will provide the legisla
tive history behind TItle III and Congress' intent in enacting and
then amending § 2517(3). Part I.B will discuss the discovery rules
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and their provision for
broad discovery. Part I.C will examine prior case law that considers
§ 2517(3) in the'context of civillitigatio~. Part II will discuss the
factual setting and the procedural history of In re Electronic Evi
dence and the majority and dissenting opinions issued by the appel
late court. Part III will analyze the holdings of the courts of appeals
to date, including the holding of In re Electronic Evidence, which
state that third parties (the general public and private litigants)
should have access to wiretap materials that have been previously
disclosed in a trial or in another courtroom proceeding. Part III
will also compare the holdings of the courts of appeals with the
language and legislative history of § 2517(3) and the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure's allowanc,e for broad discovery. This compari
son will illustrate that § 2517(3) should be interpreted as authoriz
ing the disclosure of previously undisclosed surveillance evidence to
8. In re Motion to Unseal Electronic Surveillance Evidence, 965 F.2d 637, 638
(8th Cir. 1992), vacated, 990 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (citing Smith v. Lipton,
No. 91-643C(1) (E.D. Mo. May 7,1991».
9. Id.
10. Id. at 639.
11. In re Motion to Unseal Electronic Surveillance Evidence, 990 F.2d 1015 (8th
Cir. 1993) (en banc).
12. Id. at 1020.
13. Id.
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private litigants before the civil trial commences 'as well as during
the civil tria1. 14
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

Legislative History of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968

Title III was drafted as part of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968.15 The purpose of the Act was: (1) "to
assist State and local governments in reducing the incidence of
crime;" (2) "to increase the effectiveness, fairness, and coordination
of law enforcement and criminal justice systems at all levels of gov
ernment;" and (3) "for other purposes."16 The Act was divided into
five titlesP Title III, "Wrretapping and Electronic Surveillance,"
was enacted to prohibit all wiretapping and electronic surveillance
by persons other than authorized law enforcement, communica
tions, and government officials. 1s Title III had a dual purpose: (1)
to "protect[·] the privacy of wire and oral communications;" and (2)
to "delineat[e] on a uniform basis the circumstances and conditions
under which the interception of wire and oral communications may
be authorized. "19 To achieve these two purposes, Congress drafted
Title III to conform to the constitutional standards established by
14. For a general discussion of In re Electronic Evidence, see Thomas W. Jerry,
Note, The End of the Line? In re Motion to Unseal Electronic Surveillance Evidence:
Limiting Private Civil RICO Litigants' Access to Government Wiretaps, 38 ST. Lours U.
L.J. 769 (1994). Noting Congress' concern with privacy in enacting Title Ill, the author
concludes that the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit properly interpreted
§ 2517(3) of Title III as prohibiting the disclosure of wiretap evidence acquired by the
government to private civil RICO litigants. Id.
15. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 254
. (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1988)).
16. S. REp. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N.2112. Other purposes include setting standards for the admissibility into
trial of certain evidence and "reliev[ing] [the] overburdened Federal courts from the
growing practice of convicted persons using the habeas corpus procedures as a substi
tute for direct appeal." Id. at 2113.
17. Id. Title I concerned "Law Enforcement Assistance." Title II concerned the
"Admissibility of Confessions, Reviewability of Admission in Evidence of Confessions
in State Cases, Admissibility in Evidence of Eyewitness Testimony, and Procedures in
Obtaining Writs of Habeas Corpus." Title III concerned "Wiretapping and Electronic
Surveillance." Title IV dealt with "State Firearms Control Assistance." Title V con
cerned "General Provisions" of the Act. Id.
18. Id. at 2113, 2153-54.
19. Id. at 2153. See also Thomas C. Banks, Note, Use of Surveillance Evidence
Under Title IlL' Bridging the Legislative Gap Between the Language and Purpose of the
. Sealing Requirement, 36 V AND. L. REv. 325,327-28 (1983) for a similar statement of the
congressional objectives in enacting Title III.
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the United States Supreme Court in the 1967 decisions of Berger v.
New York 20 and Katz v. United States,21 which held that eavesdrop
ping on private conversations by the state is a seizure under the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.22 "Working
from the hypothesis that any wiretapping and electronic surveil
lance legislation should include the ... constitutional standards [set
out by the Supreme Court], the [Senate] subcommittee ... used the
20. 388 U.S. 41 (1967). In Berger, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
petitioner's conviction for conspiring to bribe a public official. The conviction was
achieved, in great part, by utilizing recordings of incriminating conversations. The re
cordings were obtained by installing a recording device in an office, pursuant to an
order issued by a state supreme court justice in accordance with a New York state stat
ute. The Court held that the New York eavesdrop statute was unconstitutional because
it resulted in a trespassory intrusion into the petitioner's Fourth Amendment right to
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at 44.
The Berger Court outlined the constitutional standards by which the New York
eavesdrop statute and other similar statutes would be measured. The Court's findings
are summarized as follows: (1) the application for the court-ordered eavesdrop must
particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized; (2)
the application must particularly describe what specific crime has been or is being com
mitted; (3) the application must give a particular description of the type of conversation
sought; (4) certain limitations on the police officer executing the court-ordered eaves
drop are necessary, such as an inability to search unauthorized areas and an inability to
use the court-order as'a "passkey to a further search" once the sought after conversa
tion or information had been found; (5) police officers must obtain a new court-order
supported by probable cause when resuming a search they have previously abandoned;
(6) police officers cannot execute a court-order over a "prolonged and extended pe
riod;" and (7) an executing police officer must make a return on the court-order show
ing how it was executed and what was seized. Id. at 55-57.
21. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, the Supreme Court affirmed the constitutional
criteria it set out in Berger and stressed an additional factor: a neutral and detached
magistrate should preside over the application for and court-ordering of the eavesdrop.
Id. at 356. Applying this additional factor, the Supreme Court reversed the petitioner's
conviction for placing bets via telephone in violation of a federal anti-gambling statute,
because the recordings of petitioner's incriminating telephone conversations admitted
into trial as evidence were made with neither authorization nor supervision by a neutral
magistrate. In this case, FBI agents had taken it upon themselves to attach a recording
device to the public telephone booth from where the petitioner placed his betting calls
in order to electronically survey-the resulting conversations. Because there was no neu
tral magistrate to evaluate the presence or absence of probable cause in placing the
recording device on the telephone booth or to evaluate the ensuing surveillance and
recording, the Court held the activity to be a violation of the petitioner's Fourth
Amendment right of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at 356-57,
359.
22. U.S. CoNST. amend. IV states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or
things to be seized.
Id.
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Berger and Katz decisions as a guide in drafting [T]itle III. "23
1.

Section 2517(3) of TItle III as Enacted in 196824

Paragraphs (1) and (2) of § 2517, as enacted in 1968,25 author
ized investigative or law enforcement officers, who had obtained
knowledge of the contents26 of any intercepted communication or
evidence derived from that communication, to disclose such infor
23. S. REp. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2163. See Michael Goldsmith, The Supreme Court and Title III:
Rewriting the Law of Electronic Surveillance, 74 J. CIuM. L. & CIuMINOWGY I, 7-32
(1983) (discussing the Supreme Court decisions that ultimately induced Congress to
adopt TItle III).
24. As originally enacted in 1968, § 2517, Authorization for Disclosure and Use of
Intercepted Wire and Oral Communications, read as follows:
(1) Any investigative or law enforcement officer who, by any means
authorized by this chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire
or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, may disclose such
contents to another investigative or law enforcement officer to the extent that
such disclosure is appropriate to the proper performance of the official duties
of the officer making or receiving the disclosure.
(2) Any investigative or law enforcement officer who, by any means
authorized by this chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire
or oral communication or evidence derived therefrom may use such contents
to the extent such use is appropriate to the proper performance of his official
duties.
(3) Any person who has received, by any means authorized by this chapter,
any information concerning a wire or oral communication, or evidence derived
therefrom intercepted in accordance with the provisions of this chapter may
disclose the contents of that communication or such derivative evidence while
giving testimony under oath or affirmation in any criminal proceeding in any
court of the United States or of any State or in any Federal or State grand jury
proceeding.
(4) No otherwise privileged wire or oral communication intercepted in
accordance with, or in violation of, the provisions of this chapter shall lose its
privileged character.
(5) When an investigative or law enforcement officer, while engaged in
intercepting wire or oral communications in the manner authorized herein,
intercepts wire or oral communications relating to offenses other than those
specified in the order of authorization or approval, the contents thereof, and
evidence derived therefrom, may be disclosed or used as provided in
subsections (1) and (2) of this section. Such contents and any evidence
derived therefrom may be used under subsection (3) of this section when
authorized or approved by a judge of competent jurisdiction where such judge
finds on subsequent application that the contents were otherwise intercepted
in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. Such application shall be
made as soon as practicable.
18 U.S.c. § 2517 (Supp. IV 1969).
25. See supra note 24 for the text of § 2517(1), (2) as originally enacted in 1968.
26. The statute defined "contents" as including "any information concerning the
identity of the parties to such communication or the existence, substance, purport, or
meaning of that communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (Supp. IV 1969).
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mation to other officers or to use such information in the perform
ance of their legal duties.27 Paragraph (3) of the section provided
that:
Any person who has received, by any means authorized by th[e]
chapter, any information concerning a wire or oral communica
tion, or evidence derived therefrom ... may disclose the contents
of that communication or such derivative evidence while giving
testimony under oath or affirmation in any criminal proceeding in
any court of the United States or of any State or in any Federal
or State grand jury proceeding.28

In enacting § 2517(3), Congress envisioned that such intercepted
evidence would be disclosed and used at a criminal trial to "estab
lish [a defendant's] guilt directly."29 Congress also envisioned that
intercepted evidence could be utilized to establish guilt indirectly
by corroborating or impeaching a witness' testimony or by refresh
ing a witness' memory.30 Congress' use of the word "guilt" rather
than "liability" in the Senate Report accompanying the proposed
bill,31 coupled with the authorization for disclosure "in any criminal
proceeding,"32 makes it clear, however, that Congress did not con
template disclosure of intercepted communications or derivative
evidence in anything but a criminal action. Disclosure or use in a
civil action was not even considered a possibility until 1970, when
§ 2517(3) was amended.
2.

The 1970 Amendment to Section 2517(3)33

Congress enacted the Organized Crime Control Act of 197034
27. 18 U.S.c. § 2517(1), (2) (Supp. IV 1969).
28. 18 U.S.c. § 2517(3) (Supp. IV 1969) (emphasis added).
29. S. REp. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2188.
30. Id. at 2188-89.
31. Id. at 2188.
32. See supra note 28 and accompanying text for the text of § 2517(3) as origi
nally enacted in 1968.
33. Section 2517(3), as amended in 1970, states:
Any person who has received, by any means authorized by this chapter, any
infonnation concerning a wire, oral, or electronic communication, or evidence
derived therefrom intercepted in accordance with the provisions of this
chapter may disclose the contents of that communication or such derivative
evidence while giving testimony under oath or affirmation in any proceeding
held under the authority of the United States or of any State or political
subdivision thereof.
18 U.S.C. § 2517(3) (1988) (emphasis added).
34. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1073.
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to "seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by
strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by
establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced
sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of
those engaged in organized crime."35 Title IX of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970,36 entitled the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"),37 authorized both criminal
and civil penalties for engaging in racketeering activities. 38 In addi
tion, RICO amended § 2517(3) of Title IIp9 to provide for testimo
nial disclosure of the contents of wire, oral, or electronic
communications or evidence derived from such contents in "any
proceeding held under the authority of the United States or of any
State or political subdivision thereof."40
In the House of Representatives Report accompanying the
proposed bill for the Organized Crime Control Act, the House in
terpreted § 2517(3), as amended by RICO, as "authoriz[ing] civil
treble damage suits on the part of private parties who are injured"41
and providing for "civil investigative demands."42 Specifically, the
House Report interpreted the amended § 2517(3) as "permit[ting]
evidence obtained through the interception of wire or oral commu
nications under court order to be employed in civil actions. "43
B.

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure's Provisions for Broad
Discovery

Title III, as originally enacted and as amended, was an attempt
by Congress to balance competing interests. The discovery rules of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are a congressional attempt to
35. Id.
36. 18 U.S.c. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
37. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act was enacted as TI
tle IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901(a), 84
Stat. 941 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988».
38. H.R. REp. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1970), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N.4007. Congress defined "racketeering activity" to include "murder, kid
naping [sic], gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, narcotics violations, counter
feiting, usury, mail/bankruptcy/wire/securities fraud, and obstruction of justice." Id. at
4032.
39. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 254
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1988».
40. 18 U.S.c. § 2517(3) (1988). See supra note 28 and accompanying text for the
language of § 2517(3) prior to the 1970 amendment.
41. H.R. REp. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1970), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4010.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 4036.
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strike a similar balance. Title III attempted to balance the privacy
interests of individuals engaged in wire, oral, and electronic com
munications with the needs of government and law enforcement
personnel to obtain access to those communications. The discovery
rules attempt to balance the privacy interests of individuals possess
ing certain information with the needs of civil litigants in obtaining
access to that information.
The stated purpose of discovery is to "aid [civil litigants] in the
preparation or presentation of [their] case[s]"44 by granting them
access to pertinent facts, names of witnesses, specific documents, or
"any other matters which may aid"45 them. Congress authorized
civil litigants to obtain such information by several methods,46 in
cluding written and oral depositions,47 written interrogatories,48 and
production of documents or objects for inspection.49 Depositions
are out-of-court proceedings conducted under oath before a judicial
officer in answer to questions or interrogatories.50 Interrogatories
are questions about the litigation at issue submitted before trial by
one party to the other party, witness, or other person having infor
mation of interest in the case, the answers to which are usually
given under oath. 51
In order to aid civil litigants in the preparation of their actions,
Congress enacted broad discovery rules containing general lan
guage. Rule 26(b)(1), delineating the scope and limits of discovery,
states that "[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action. "52 Congress also instructed the courts to interpret
the discovery rules broadly. For example, the Advisory Commit
tee's explanatory statement regarding the 1970 amendments to the
discovery rules stated that the amendments were "designed to en
courage extrajudicial discovery with a minimum of court
interven tion. "53
44. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee's note.
45. Id. The United States Supreme Court has stated that access to and knowl
edge of such information is necessary for a civil action to be properly adjudicated.
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
46. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a).
47. FED. R. CIV. P. 27-32 govern the taking and use of depositions.
48. FED. R. CIV. P. 33 governs the taking and use of interrogatories.
49. FED. R. Cw. P. 34 and 45 govern the production of documents and things in
response to requests and subpoenas, respectively.
50. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 440 (6th ed. 1990). See also FED. R. CIv. P.27-32.
51. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 819 (6th ed. 1990). See also FED. R. CIv. P. 33.
52. FED. R. Cw. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added).
53. FED. R. CIv. P. 2,6-37 advisory committee's explanatory statement. On April
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Despite the discovery rules' stated purpose of promoting ac
cess to as much relevant information as possible, the rules contain
provisions that check civil litigants' power to gain access to informa
tion when such access would overburden or infringe upon the pri
vacy interests of another party. Specifically, Rule 26(c) provides
that a protective order may be issued by a court, upon motion by a
party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, when neces
sary to protect the party or person from "annoyance, embarrass
ment, oppression, or undue burden or expense."54 Protective
orders afford such protection by permitting courts to allow a discov
ery request to be ignored. 55 They also authorize courts to require
that certain information not be requested, or if already requested,
not produced. 56 Furthermore, protective orders permit courts to
require parties to conduct discovery with no witnesses present other
than court-designated ones. 57 Such limitations on the discovery
process ensure that civil litigants gather as much information as
possible while protecting the privacy interests of the persons from
.
whom the information is sought. 58
22,1993, the Supreme Court submitted proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, including several changes to the discovery rules. Congress took no
action against the amendments. As a result, the amendments went into effect on De
cember I, 1993. The changes to the discovery rules were designed to minimize court
intervention in the discovery process while maximizing the opportunities of opposing
litigants to work together to develop a discovery schedule for the action. See Hon.
Ronald J. Hedges, What You Should Know About the Proposed Civil Procedure Rules
Amendments, 39 PRAC. LAW. December 1993, at 33 for a brief synopsis of the major
alterations to the discovery rules by the 1993 amendments.
54. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(c).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(c), Protective Orders, reads as follows:
Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought,
accompanied by a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or
attempted to confer with other affected parties in an effort to resolve the dis
pute without court action, and for good cause shown, the court in which the
action is pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court
in the district where the deposition is to be taken may make any order which
justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the follow
ing[;] (1) that the disclosure or discovery not be had: [sic] (2) that the disclo
sure or discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including
a designation of the time or place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by a
method of discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery;
(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the disclosure
or discovery be limited to certain matters; (5) that discovery be conducted
with no one present except persons designated by the court; (6) that a deposi
tion, after being sealed, be opened only by order of the court; (7) that a trade

380

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:371

As additional protection of the privacy interests of persons
possessing discoverable information, the rules contain built-in stan
dards by which discovery will be allowed or denied. The Advisory
Committee's explanatory statement concerning the 1970 amend
ments to the discovery rules states that "a showing of need is re
quired for discovery of 'trial preparation' materials."59 Rule
26(b )(3) states that "a party may obtain discovery of documents
and tangible things otherwise discoverable ... only upon a showing
that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materi
als ... and that the party is unable without undue hardship to ob
tain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means."60
Rule 34 requires a special showing before the production of docu
ments and tangible things will be allowed. 61 With respect to the
production of documents prepared in anticipation of litigation or
trial, a showing of "substantial need of the materials in the prepara
tion of the case and [an] inability without undue hardship to obtain
the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means is neces
sary."62 With respect to the production of documents not prepared
in anticipation of litigation or trial, "a showing that the documents
are relevant to the subject matter of the action is necessary."63
The discovery rules also contain standards for denying a civil
litigant's discovery request. Rule 26(b )(2) states that "[t]he fre
quency or extent of use of the discovery methods ... shall be lim
ited by the court if it determines that ... the burden . . . of the
secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information
not be revealed or be revealed only in a designated way; and (8) that the par
ties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed
envelopes to be opened as directed by the court.
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court
may, on such terms and conditions as are just, order that any party or other
person provide or permit discovery. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to
the award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion.
Id.
59. FED. R. CIY. P. 26-37 advisory committee's explanatory statement.
60. FED. R. CIY. P. 26(b)(3) (emphasis added).
61. FED. R. CIY. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee's note states that "Rule 34 in
terms requires a showing of 'good cause' for the production of all documents and
things, whether or not trial preparation is involved." Id. The phrase "good cause" was
eliminated from the language of Rule 34 because it "tended to encourage confusion and
controversy." Id. However, the requirement of a "special showing" was retained. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. (citing Bell v. Commercial Ins. Co., 280 F.2d 514, 517 (3d Cir. 1960); Hou
dry Process Corp. v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 24 F.R.D. 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1959);
Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 17 F.R.D. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1955».
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proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit."64 To make this de
termination, the court must "tak[e] into account the needs of the
case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the impor
tance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of
the proposed discovery in resolving the issue. "65
Subsequent to the enactments in 1970 of the amendments to
the discovery rules and to § 2517(3) of Title III, federal district and
appellate courts debated whether § 2517(3), as amended,allowed
private civil litigants to obtain disclosure during discovery of sur
veillance material gathered by the government pursuant to Title III.
These courts focused on disclosure of surveillance material that had
not been exposed to the public in an earlier criminal trial and would
not be revealed through testimony in the civil trial.
C.

Case Law Prior to In re Motion to Unseal Electronic .
Surveillance Evidence66

Courts that have addressed whether § 2517(3) of Title III au
thorizes disclosure of wiretap evidence to the public at large or to
private civil litigants 'have concluded that § 2517(3) allows such dis
closure only after the materials have been admitted into evidence at
an earlier criminal tria1. 67 No court has read § 2517(3) to authorize
disclosure of wiretap material to the general public or to private
litigants prior to the materials' use in a criminal trial or during the
discovery phase of a private litigant's civil action. 68
1.

United States v. Dorfman 69

In United States v. Dorfman, various newspaper publishers and
broadcasters moved the court to unseal evidence exhibits submitted
by the government so that the exhibits could be inspected and cop
ied,1° All of the exhibits contained wiretap materials. The criminal
64. FED. R. CIY. P. 26(b)(2).
65. Id.
66. 990 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
67. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 735 F.2d 51, 54
55 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Dorfman, 690 F.2d 1230, 1233 (7th Cir. 1982); County
of Oakland v. City of Detroit, 610 F. Supp. 364, 369 (E.D. Mich. 1984), appeal denied
sub nom. Oakland County by Kuhn v. Detroit, 762 F.2d 1010 (6th Cir. 1985).
68. In County of Oakland, 610 F. Supp. at 370, the court stated that disclosing
previously undisclosed surveillance materials to private litigants pursuing civil RICO
claims "presents a different problem" than the one before the court. Id. The court
declined to address the issue because the case could be resolved on other grounds. Id.
69. 690 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. 1982).
70. Id. at 1231.
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defendants argued that the court could not release any of the sealed
exhibits because they had not yet been put into evidence at the
criminal trial. The defendants urged that the release of the exhibits
would violate Title 111.71 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir
cuit held that Title III does not create a right of public access to
sealed wiretap evidence.72 According to the court in dicta, the only
way that the public would have a right of access to the sealed wire
tap evidence acquired by the government would be after the sealed
evidence had been admitted into evidence in a criminal trial or in
"some other public proceeding within the scope of section
2517(3)."73 The court failed, however, to specify what other types
of public proceedings are within the scope of § 2517(3). The Dorf
man court was most likely referring to a civil trial or other public
proceeding conducted pursuant to a civil action. Such a proceeding
is, in fact, what Congress intended when it amended § 2517(3).74

2.

National Broadcasting Co. v. United States Department of
Justice 75

In National Broadcasting Co. v. United States Department of
Justice, the National Broadcasting Company ("NBC") sought per
mission from the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut to inspect and copy wiretap recordings made by the
government pursuant to Title 111.'6 NBC wanted to use the wiretap
recordings in its defense of a libel action filed against it by popular
singer Wayne Newton.77 NBC believed that the wiretap recordings
would prove that NBC's television broadcasts concerning Wayne
Newton and his connection to organized crime members were accu
rate and true. 78 The government opposed the disclosure of the
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1233.
73. Id. The court stated that Title III "put no limits on the public disclosure of
lawfully obtained wiretap evidence through public testimony in legal proceedings; but
neither did it authorize wiretap evidence not made public in this manner to be made
public another way." Id. at 1234.
74. The House Report accompanying the 1970 amendment to § 2517(3) stated
that Congress was altering the language of the statute in order to permit wire or oral
communications evidence to be employed in civil actions. H.R. REp. No. 1549, 91st
Cong.,2d Sess. 18 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007,4036. See supra notes
33-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the language and legislative history of
§ 2517(3) as amended.
75. 735 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1984).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 52.
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recordings. 79
NBC argued that the 1970 amendment to § 2517(3) allows the
government to disclose a communication obtained by a legal wire
tap "in any proceeding held under the authority of the United
States."80 NBC argued that its defense of the libel action was
within the definition of "any proceeding" and that, therefore, the
district court judge had erred in denying its application for disclo
sure by the government. 81 The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit agreed with the district court, however, that there should be
no disclosure to NBC. The NBC court ·stated that it was certam
that Congress did not intend § 2517(3) "to make the fruits of wire
tapping broadly available to all civil litigants who show a need for
them,"82 and that "turning Title III into a general civil discovery
mechanism would simply ignore the privacy rights of those whose
conversations are overheard."83
3.

County of Oakland v. City of Detroit84

Eight months after the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
handed down its decision in NBC, a federal district court in Michi
gan also concluded that § 2517(3) did not authorize the disclosure
of surveillance material gathered by the government to private civil
litigants. In County of Oakland v. City of Detroit,85 the County of
Oakland brought an action against the Mayor of Detroit and the
City of Detroit for violating the Sherman Act86 and RIC087
through bribery, corruption, and breach of fiduciary duty.88 The
County of Oakland had entered into several contracts with the City
of Detroit in ·which the city was to transport, treat, and dispose of
the county's waste to the city's facilities. The contract price was
based on the city's actual cost in providing the specified services.89
In its action, the county contended that the city inflated its costs in
providing the services, which inflated the amount that the city
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
by Kuhn
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
18 U.S.c. § 2517(3) (1988).
NBC, 735 F.2d at 54.
Id.
Id.
610 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Mich. 1984), appeal denied sub nom Oakland County
v. Detroit, 762 F.2d 1010 (6th Cir. 1985) ..
Id.
15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 15 (1988).
18 U.S.C. § 1964(a), (c) (1988).
County of Oakland, 610 F. Supp. at 365.
89. Id.
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charged the county, thereby violating the Sherman Act and
RICO.90
As part of its action, the county subpoenaed the Assistant
United States Attorney for release of wiretaps the United States
Attorney's Office had obtained pursuant to Title III as part of a
criminal investigation of the Detroit Water and Sewage Depart
ment ("DWSD").91 Some of the wiretaps sought by the county had
been previously disclosed at the criminal trials of DWSD officials. 92
The court held that it would honor the subpoenas seeking surveil
lance material disclosed during the criminal trials, because once ma
terial has been disclosed, it becomes a question of the public's right
to access to evidence admitted in open court versus a defendant's
privacy interests. 93 The court stated that, in this situation, the pub
lic's right to access prevailed.94
The county also sought surveillance material that had not pre
viously been disclosed by the government in any of the earlier crim
inal trials of DWSD officials. 95 The court found no authority for
such disclosure of materials in the 1970 amendment to § 2517(3).
Although "the 1970 amendment to § 2517(3) clearly indicates that
Congress intended that surveillance material gathered pursuant to
Title III could be used in some civil proceedings,"96 the court rea
soned that "it is not clear that Congress intended private litigants
pursuing civil RICO claims could gain access to such surveillance
materials."97 In addition to § 2517(3)'s lack of clarity as to whom
previously undisclosed surveillance materials could be disclosed,
the court observed that § 2517(3) is also unclear as to the manner in
which the materials can be disclosed. The court noted that the 1970
amendment to § 2517(3) did not change the section's language re-.
garding the method of disclosure. The court reasoned that Con
gress therefore intended the same method of disclosure that had
been permitted in the 1968 version of § 2517(3) to apply.98 The
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 366.
93. Id. at 369.
94. Id. The court held that the public's right to access prevails because once sur
veillance material has been disclosed, "the purpose of Section 2517(3) ceases and the
requirements of that section no longer govern" so that "the privacy interests of the
defendants cannot stand as an obstacle to the public's access to evidence admitted in
open court." Id.
95. Id. at 370.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. The court also pointed to a federal district court case concluding that
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1968 version allowed disclosure "while giving testimony under oath

or affirmation in any criminal proceeding in any" federal or state
court or grand jury.99 The court concluded that "it appears that
disclosure of the wiretap material not presented during the criminal
trials [for use in the county's civil action against the city] cannot be
required pursuant to pre-trial or discovery subpoenas absent some
further showing," without elaborating as to what such "further
showing" would be.lOo
4.

United States v. Rosentha[101

In United States v. Rosenthal, the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit relied on dicta in United States v. Dorfman 102 to
hold that Title III creates no' independent bar to the public's right
of access to wiretap materials legally intercepted and previously ad
mitted into evidence at a criminal trial pursuant to TItle III. In Ro
senthal, a television station filed a motion to review all
documentary and physical evidence, which included wiretap materi
als obtained by the government that had been or was going to be
admitted as evidence in a criminal trial. The Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit ruled that, once the materials have been ad
mitted into evidence in a court proceeding, "there is no indication
either in Title III or its legislative history to support [a] court's con
clusion that TItle III material may not be further disclosed."1()3 The
court stated that once "the audiotapes were played in open 'court
[in a criminal trial] and admitted into evidence, [it could] perceive
of no legitimate reason to create an absolute bar of further dissemi
nation of these materials"l04 to a public entity - in this case a tele
vision station.
In none of the aforementioned cases did a court interpret
§ 2517(3) to authorize disclosure of government-acquired wiretap
disclosure pursuant to § 2517(3) could only be made through the trial testimony of a
government agent. Id. (citing Dowd v. Calabrese, 101 F.R.D. 427 (D.D.C. 1984».
99. 18 U.S.c. § 2517(3) (Supp. IV 1969) (emphasis added).
lOll County of Oakland, 610 F. Supp. at 371. The court's language left the door
open for the second prong of the In re Electronic Evidence panel opinion's balancing
test, which required that disclosure to private litigants be denied absent a showing by
the private litigant of a compelling need that cannot be met any other way. In re Mo
tion to Unseal Electronic Surveillance Evidence, 965 F.2d 637, 642 (8th Cir. 1992), va
cated, 990 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc). See infra note 129 and accompanying
text for the panel opinion's five-part balancing test.
101. 763 F.2d 1291 (11th Cir. 1985).
102. 690 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. 1982).
103. Rosenthal, 763 F.2d at 1293.
104. Id.
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materials to the public or to a private litigant before the materials
were disclosed in a criminal trial. Recently, the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit directly addressed and then readdressed the
issue of pre-trial disclosure in In re Motion to Unseal Electronic Sur
veillance Evidence .105
II.

IN RE MOTION TO UNSEAL ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
EVIDENCE106

A. Facts and Procedural History
Donn H. Lipton was involved in real estate development trans
actions with several business associates in St. Louis, Missouri. 1\vo
of Lipton's business associates, Sorkis Webbe, Sr. and Sorkis
Webbe, Jr., were under criminal investigation by the Federal Bu
reau of Investigation ("FBI").107 Pursuant to the investigation, the
FBI conducted an electronic surveillance of the Webbes' offices, in
tercepting and taping many conversations that took place in those
locations. lOB Among the intercepted and taped conversations were
conversations that the Webbes had with Donn Lipton.1 09
The government prosecuted the Webbes in 1985 in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. llo During
the course of Sorkis Webbe, Jr.'s criminal trial, the FBI introduced
some of the taped conversations between Lipton and Webbe, Jr. as
evidence. 1ll The remainder of the taped conversations were'"not
admitted into Webbe Jr.'s criminal trial. Instead, the tapes were
placed under seal by the trial COurt. 112
Howard J. Smith was also involved in real estate transactions
with Donn Lipton. In 1990, when several of the transactions
proved unsuccessful, Smith filed a civil suit against Lipton in the
Circuit Court of St. Louis City on theories of fraud, tortious inter
105. 965 F.2d 637 (8th Cir. 1992), vacated, 990 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
106. 990 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
107. Id. at 1016.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. (citing United States v. Webbe, 652 F. Supp. 20 (E.D. Mo. 1985». Ulti
mately, only Sorkis Webbe, Jr. was brought to trial. Prior to trial, Sorkis Webbe, Sr.
died. Webbe, 652 F. Supp. at 22.
111. In re Electronic Evidence, 990 F.2d at 1016 (citing United States v. Webbe,
791 F.2d 103, 104 (8th Cir. 1986». See also Webbe, 652 F. Supp. at 22 (denying Sorkis
Webbe, Jr.'s motion to suppress the taped conversations and other electronic surveil
lance evidence).
112. In re Electronic Evidence, 990 F.2d at 1016.

1995]

GOVERNMENT ACQUIRED WIRETAP EVIDENCE

387

ference, breach of fiduciary duty, and violations of RICO.113 Dur
ing the discovery phase of the civil suit, Smith filed a motion in
federal district court for the Eastern District of Missouri to unseal
the tapes of conversations between Lipton and the Webbes. 114
Smith believed that the taped conversations contained information
that would support his allegation of RICO violations by Lipton.1 15
The district court held that its authority, if any, to provide
Smith with access to the taped conversations could come only from
§ 2517(3) of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968.116 However, the district court interpreted
§ 2517(3) as prohibiting such access. 117 Smith then appealed the
district court's interpretation to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit. I IS
B. Panel Opinion 119
1.

Majority Opinion of Judge Beam

For guidance in determining whether § 2517(3), as amended in
1970,120 authorizes disclosure of intercepted communications not
previously made public in a prior criminal or civil trial to private
civil litigants, the panel opinion looked first to the purpose and in
tent of Congress in enacting TItle III. The court stated that the pur
pose of TItle III was to "balance the needs of criminal-law
enforcement with the privacy interest of individuals engaged in
wire, oral, or electronic communications."121 The court noted that
Congress balanced these two competing interests by allowing the
government to intercept such communications but with certain limi
tations. 122 However, the court was not as certain about Congress'
intent in amending § 2517(3) of TItle III within RICO. According
113. Id.
114. Id. (citing Smith v. Lipton, No. 91-643C(1), slip. op. at 1 (E.D. Mo. May 7,
1991».
115. Id.
116. In re Electronic Evidence, 965 F.2d at 638.
117. Id.
118. In re Motion to Unseal Electronic Surveillance Evidence, 965 F.2d 637 (8th
Cir. 1992), vacated, 990 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
119. Id.
120. See supra note 33 for the text of § 2517(3) as amended.
121. In re Electronic Evidence, 965 F.2d at 640 (citing Title III - Wiretapping &
Electronic Surveillance: Findings, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 801,82 Stat. 211, 211 (1968),
reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 237). For a list of the purposes of Title III, see supra
notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
122. In re Electronic Evidence, 965 F.2d at 640. The limitations include authoriz
ing interception only for specifically enumerated offenses. Id. (citing 18 U.S.c.
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to the court, it was "not at all clear" that, when Congress "included
the amendment to section 2517(3) within ... RICO," it intended to
grant private civil litigants· access to previously undisclosed inter
cepted communications. 123 It was "not at all clear" to the court be
cause no commentary in the congressional report on RICO
addressed that particular question. 124 The court refused to "specu
late" about Congress' intent. Rather, it looked elsewhere in order
to resolve the issue. 125
The court compared communications intercepted pursuant to
Title III to "any other evidence seized"126 and concluded that both
types of evidence should be subject to the policy and evidentiary
concerns of the discovery rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce
·dure.1 27 Since the discovery rules carefully balance the confidenti
ality and privacy interests of litigants with the "compelling need for
discovery,"l28 the court in In re Electronic Evidence fashioned a
five-part test that also balanced these competing interests in order
to determine when intercepted communications evidence may be
disclosed to private civil litigants. The five-part test developed by
the court was as follows:
[A]ny government objection to disclosure should be afforded
great weight. Additionally, disclosure is never proper unless the
party seeking disclosure has shown a compelling need that can
not be accommodated by any other means. Thus, the court
should conduct an in camera inspection of the intercepted com
munications to evaluate whether a compelling need exists. Fur
thermore, if the confidentiality or privacy interests of a nonparty
appear to be substantially compromised by disclosure, the party
seeking disclosure has an affirmative duty to notify the non
party.... Finally, ... [t]he party requesting access must particu
larize his or her request and the district court should issue
protective orders as it deems appropriate. 129

The court held that wiretap evidence not previously made public
§ 2516(1) (1988». Limitations also include interception only with prior court approval.
Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516(2), 2518 (1988».
123. Id.
124. Id. (citing S. REp. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1969) and H.R. REp. No.
1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4034).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 641.
127. Id. The discovery rules are contained in Rules 26-37 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37.
128. In re Electronic Evidence, 965 F.2d at 641.
129. Id. at 642 (citation omitted).
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may be disclosed to private civil litigants pursuant to § 2517(3) if
this five-part test is met,130 Thereafter, the court reversed the deci
sion of the district court prohibiting disclosure of the sealed wiretap
evidence to Smith as a civil litigant and remanded the case "for
findings consistent with [its] opinion."131
2.

Dissenting Opinion of Judge Heaney132

Judge Heaney, in his dissent, agreed with the district court that
§ 2517 did not authorize the disclosure of electronically intercepted

conversations to private litigants where that information has not
been disclosed previously in a trial. 133 Judge Heaney stated that the
majority's five-part test 134 was contrary to the plain meaning of
§ 2517(3) and Congress' intent in enacting and amending
§ 2517(3).1 35 He also stated that "parts of the test [were] vague,
providing little guidance to district courts that must apply it."136 To
support his position of nondisclosure, Judge Heaney looked first to
the plain meaning of § 2517 and stated that he could see "no words
in section 2517 that permit law enforcement officers to disclose to
private litigants information obtained for law enforcement purposes
unless that information has first been disclosed in a public trial."137
Judge Heaney then cited to "Congress's [sic] clear intent to protect
the privacy of oral and written communications to the greatest ex
tent possible"· as further support for his position of
nondisclosure. 138
Lipton petitioned for a rehearing en banco The Court of Ap
peals for the Eighth Circuit granted the petition and vacated the
panel opinion. 139 Thereafter, by a vote of seven to five, the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the order of the district
130. Id. at 641.
131. Id. at 642.
132. Id. at 642-43 (Heaney, J., dissenting). Judge Heaney wrote for the majority
in the en banc opinion of In re Motion to Unseal Electronic Surveillance Evidence, 990
F.2d 1015, 1016-20 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc). See infra part II.C for a discussion of
Judge Heaney's majority opinion.
133. In re Electronic Evidence, 965 F.2d at 642 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
134. See supra note 129 and accompanying text for the majority opinion's fivepart test.
.
135. In re Electronic Evidence, 965 F.2d at 642-43 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (citing
Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 48 (1972».
136. Id. at 643.
137. Id. at 642.
138. Id.
139. In re Motion to Unseal Electronic Surveillance Evidence, 990 F.2d 1015 (8th
Cir. 1993) (en banc).
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court.140
C.

En Bane Opinion of Judge Heaney141

Judge Heaney, this time writing for the majority,142 held that
there was no authority in § 2517(3) of Title III for sealed electronic
surveillance evidence, not previously made public, to be disclosed
to a private civil RICO litigant. 143 Judge Heaney stated that, when
addressing disclosure of the contents of a wiretap, the question the
court must ask is "whether TItle III specifically authorizes such dis
closure, not whether TItle III specifically prohibits the disclosure,"
because TItle III prohibits all disclosures that are not specifically
authorized. l44 Noting the drafters' concern for conversational pri
vacy when originally enacting § 2517(3) and the legislative history
of the 1970 amendment to § 2517(3), the judge failed to find any
evidence that the subsection authorizes such disclosure. 145 · Judge
Heaney stated that a civil litigant's need is an irrelevant considera
tion, absent language in § 2517(3) to that effect.l46 Finally, he
stated that, if § 2517(3) does authorize disclosure to a private civil
litigant such as Smith, "[a]t no point does section 2517(3) authorize
pretrial disclosure."147
1.

Drafters' Concern for Conversational Privacy

Judge Heaney noted that TItle III was enacted in response to
two 1967 Supreme Court decisions that held eavesdropping by the'
government on private conversations to be a violation of the peti
. tioners' Fourth Amendment right to freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures. 148 · Judge Heaney noted that one of the two
stated purposes of Title III was to "protect[] the privacy of wire
140. Id. at 1020.
141. Id. at 1015.
142. Judge Heaney wrote the dissenting opinion of the panel decision of In re
Motion to Unseal Electronic Surveillance Evidence, 965 F.2d 637, 642-43 (8th Cir.
1992), vacated, 990 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc). See supra notes 132-39 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Judge Heaney's dissenting opinion.
143. In re Electronic Evidence, 990 F.2d at 1020.
144. Id. at 1018 (citing United States v. Underhill, 813 F.2d 105, 110 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906 (1987); United States v. Dorfman, 690 F.2d 1230, 1232 (7th
Cir. 1982)).
145. Id. at 1018-20.
146. Id. at 1020.
147. Id. (emphasis added).
148. In re Electronic Evidence, 990 F.2d at 1017 (citing Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967)). See supra notes 20-21 for a
discussion of Katz and Berger.
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and oral communications."149 Judge Heaney also noted that the
congressional drafters' concern for conversational privacy was evi
denced by Congress' provision for very limited disclosure. He
pointed specifically to § 2518(8)(a), which requires that recordings
made under TItle III be sealed by the authorizing judge, and § 2517,
which allows disclosure under only very specific circumstances. 150
2.

Legislative History of the 1970 Ainendment to Section
2517(3)

Judge Heaney next considered what effect the 1970 amend
ment to § 2517(3) had on the ability of the court to interpret the
subsection as authorizing disclosure of electronic surveillance evi
dence. Prior to the 1970 amendment, § 2517(3) provided for court
room testimonial disclosure in criminal proceedings only.151 With
the passage of RICO in1970, however, the subsection was amended
by Congress to allow for testimonial disclosure of electronic surveil
lance evidence in civil proceedings as well as criminal proceed
ingS. 152 Despite this alteration to the language of § 2517(3), Judge
Heaney found that the legislative history of the 1970 amendment
did not support Smith's arguinent that, as amended, § 2517(3) au
thorizes disclosure of such evidence not previously made public to
private civil RICO litigants, both before the civil trial has com
menced and during the trial. 153 In fact, Judge Heaney stated that
the-legislative history provides "no assistance" to the court's analy
sis.1 54 Quoting the district court opinion, the judge noted that the
House of Representatives Report regarding the 1970 amendment
made little comment on the amendment except to state what had
linguistically changed in the subsection. 155 Judge Heaney adopted
the reasoning of the district court, which held that, if the 1970
amendment "had been intended to open the door to private civil
149. Id. at 1018 (quoting S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1968), re
printed in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112,2153). The other purpose was to "delineat[e] on a
uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under which the interception of wire
and oral communications may be authorized." S. REp. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
66 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2153.
150. In re Electronic Evidence, 990 F.2d at 1018.
151. Id. See supra note 28 and accompanying text for the text of § 2517(3) as
originally enacted.
152. See supra note 33 for the text of § 2517(3) as amended.
153. In re Electronic Evidence, 990 F.2d at 1018.
154. Id. at 1018 n.4 (emphasis added).
155. Id. at 1019 (quoting Smith v. Lipton, No. 91-643C(1), slip op. at 5-6 (E.D.
Mo. May 7,1991».
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RICO litigants, further comment would have been warranted."156
Therefore, the brief explanation in the House Report suggests that
Congress intended only that the "gatherer" of electronic surveil
lance evidence - the government - would use it in a civil case. 157
3.

Secondary Factors Affecting Disclosure

Smith argued that the failure of the Department of Justice to
oppose disclosure of the taped conversations upon his motion in
federal district court should have been persuasive to the court in its.
determination of the issue. 158 To support his argument, Smith con
trasted the position of the Department of Justice in NBC to oppose
disclosure of wiretap evidence to NBC, a private civil litigant. 159
The government's opposition to disclosure to NBC was a significant
factor in the NBC court's determination that § 2517(3) did not au
thorize such disclosure. 16o Smith cited County of Oakland v. City of
Detroit 161 for the proposition that "the Government is apparently
given authority under § 2517(3) to determine whether release of the
material would be in the overall public interest."162 Judge Heaney
disagreed with Smith's contention that the government's deliberate
decision in this case not to oppose disclosure to Smith was relevant.
Judge Heaney held that § 2517(3) does not grant the government
authority to determine when private litigants may make use of pre
viously undisclosed wiretap information. 163 Judge Heaney based
this conclusion on a "careful reading of ... the statute itself,"I64
156. Id. (quoting Smith, No. 91-643C(1) at 5-6). Judge Heaney stated that he and
the other members of Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit "WOUld need greater
evidence of Congress's [sic] intent to read the 1970 amendment as setting [congres
sional] concerns [for conversational privacy] aside when dealing with private civil RICO
litigants." Id.
157. Id. (quoting Smith, No. 91-643C(1) at 5-6).
158. Id.
159. Id. (citing National Broadcasting Co. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 735
F.2d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1984».
160. NBC, 735 F.2d at 54.
161. 610 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Mich. 1984), appeal denied sub nom. Oakland County
by Kuhn v. Detroit, 762 F.2d 10tO (6th Cir. 1985).
162. In re Electronic Evidence, 990 F.2d at 1019 (quoting County of Oakland, 610
F. Supp. at 370 (citing National Broadcasting Co. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 735
F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1984))). See supra part I.C.3 for a discussion of County of Oakland.
163. Id. at 1019-20. The court refused to decide whether Title III allows "purely
voluntary testimonial disclosure by the government during the course of private civil
RICO litigation." Id. at 1020 n.5. However, the court stated that voluntary disclosure
by the government "would appear to require court approval under §§ 2517(3) and (5)."
Id.
164. Id. at 1019.
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noting that, simply because the government is able to decide
whether it will utilize wiretap information in a trial in which it is a
party, it does not automatically follow that the government has the
power to decide whether private litigants are able to utilize that
same information in civil trialS. 165
Finally, Smith argued that a private litigant's need for disclo
sure of electronic surveillance evidence should be another factor in
the court's determination as to whether § 2517(3) authorizes disclo
sure of electronic surveillance evidence not previously made public
to private civil RICO litigants. Judge Heaney disagreed, character
izing a private litigant's need for such evidence as "irrelevant."I66
For this proposition, Judge Heaney referred to the decision in NBC,
in which the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit looked to
Congress' intent in enacting the Organized Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act.1 67 The Second Circuit stated that, as contemplated by
the Supreme Court in Katz v. United States, 168 the purpose of the
Act was to make the fruits of wiretapping available to the govern
ment for the enforcement of criminallaw. 169 Despite the alteration
of the language in § 2517(3), removing the specific reference to
criminal proceedings, the court was "sure" that Congress did not
pass the Act to "make the fruits of wiretapping broadly available to
all civil litigants who show a need for them."17o
4. Section 2517(3) Does Not Authorize Disclosure to
Private Civil Litigants Other Than During
Testimony at Trial
Judge Heaney concluded that Title III did not authorize disclo
sure of electronic surveillance evidence previously undisclosed in an
earlier criminal trial to private civil litigants such as Howard Smith.
Further, even if it did, Title III would only authorize disclosure
through the testimony of a witness· during a subsequent civil trial,
because "[a]t no point does section 2517 authorize pretrial disclo
sure."l71 The courts that had previously addressed the issue had
reached an identical conclusion when they held that civil litigants
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1020.
167. Id. (quoting National Broadcasting Co. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 735
F.2d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1984».
168. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See supra note 21 for a discussion of Katz.
169. In re Electronic Evidence, 990 F.2d at 1020 (quoting NBC, 735 F.2d at 54).
170. Id. (quoting NBC, 735 F.2d at 54).
171. Id. at 1020 (emphasis added). By "pre-trial disclosure," the court meant dis
closure before the commencement of the private litigant's civil trial. See id. at 1020 n.5.
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could obtain electronic surveillance material only through testi
mony during their civil trials.1 72 In County of Oakland 173 and
Dowd v. Calabrese,174 the courts reasoned that their holdings com
ported with the plain language of § 2517(3),175 which provides for
disclosure of electronic communications or evidence derived from
such communications "while giving testimony under oath or affir
mation in any proceeding held under the authority of the United
States or of any State."176 In citing to these earlier decisions, Judge
Heaney agreed that the language of § 2517(3) unambiguously fails
to provide for an alternative method of disclosure, such as prior to
the commencement of a private civil litigant's trial.1 77
D. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Beam 178
In his dissent, Judge Beam began by criticizing the majority's
approach of "look[ing] not to the statutory language, [but] look[ing]
instead to the rest of the title into which the words are placed and
. . . look[ing] to 'the legislative struggle leading to its enact
ment."'179 Judge Beam criticized the court for using public policy in
its analysis of the issue rather than analyzing the issue based upon
either the "language of the law" or "commonly accepted principles
172. Id. at 1020 (citing Dowd v. Calabrese, 101 F.R.D. 427, 435 (D.D.C. 1984);
County of Oakland v. City of Detroit, 610 F. Supp. 364, 371 (E.D. Mich. 1984), appeal
denied sub nom. Oakland County by Kuhn v. Detroit, 762 F.2d 1010 (6th Cir. 1985».
173. County of Oakland v. City of Detroit, 610 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Mich. 1984),
appeal denied sub nom. Oakland County by Kuhn v. Detroit, 762 F.2d 1010 (6th Cir.
1985). See supra part I.C.3 for a discussion of this case.
174. 101 F.R.D. 427 (D.D.C. 1984). In Dowd, two former Department of Justice
attorneys brought a libel action against the Wall Street Journal and the author of an
allegedly libelous article. Id. at 430. The article alleged that the government attorneys
had acted improperly by pressuring an organized crime member to become a govern
ment witness in the prosecution of another member of organized crime. Id. The de
fendants sought disclosure of two government wiretaps in order to support their
defense of truthfulness or lack of actual malice in writing and printing the article. Id. at
434. The court denied the defendants' request on the ground that disclosure of wiretap
evidence pursuant to § 2517(3) must occur "while [the individual is] giving testimony
under oath or affirmation," and the defendants' request was for non-testimonial disclo
sure. Id. at 435.
. 175. County of Oakland, 610 F. Supp. at 370 (citing Dowd, 101 F.R.D. at 435).
176. 18 U.S.c. § 2517(3) (1988). See supra note 33 for the text of § 2517(3).
177. In re Motion to Unseal Electronic Surveillance Evidence, 990 F.2d 1015,
1020 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc).

178. Id. (Beam, J., dissenting). Judge Beam wrote for the majority in the panel
opinion of In re Motion to Unseal Electronic Surveillance Evidence, 965 F.2d 637, 638
42 (8th Cir. 1992), vacated, 990 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc). See supra part
II.B.1 for a discussion of Judge Beam's majority opinion.
179. Id. at 1020 (quoting the majority opinion at 1017 (quoting National Broad
casting Co. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 735 F.2d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1984»).
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of statutory construction."180
In analyzing the issue, Judge Beam looked first to the general
rules of law dealing with evidentiary exclusions. Judge Beam noted
the usual axiom that evidence is available unless it is specifically
protected by a rule of exclusion. 181 He criticized the majority opin
ion for contending that Title III changes this usual axiom to a rule
that wiretap material is not available for use as evidence unless its
disclosure and use is specifically authorized by § 2517. 182 Judge
Beam contended that the majority's analysis offends the public pol
icy of ascertainment of the truth,183 stating that "any construction of
section 2517(3) and Title III that serves to obscure facts or hinder
their discovery is contrary to long accepted policy formulations. "184
Judge Beam also stated that the majority's analysis misreads Title
III and ignores the more important policy goals underlying the Om
nibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968185 of combatting
organized crime and having access to as much evidence as possible
to facilitate thiS.l86
Judge Beam also criticized the majority opinion for ignoring
the accepted tools for statutory construction ordinarily employed
by federal courts,187 If a statute is unambiguous, the accepted stat
utory construction is to look to the plain meaning in order to inter
pret the statute,188 Judge Beam conceded that the terms of
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1022. Section 2517(3) contains its own exclusionary rule. It prohibits
disclosure of electronic surveillance evidence unless there has been compliance with the
requirements of each section of Title III. See Michael Goldsmith, The Supreme Court
and Title III: Rewriting the Law of Electronic Surveillance, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL
OGY I, 40 (1983).
182. In re Electronic Evidence, 990 F.2d at 1022 (Beam, J., dissenting).
183. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40,50 (1980) (quoting United
States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (quoting JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2192 (3d ed.») (" 'exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the fundamental prin
ciple that 'the public ... has a right to every man's evidence ....); United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (limitations on evidence gathering "are in derogation of the
search for truth"); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) ("normally predom
inant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth").
184. In re Electronic Evidence, 990 F.2d at 1021 (Beam, J., dissenting).
185, Id. at 1022.
186. S. REp. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2157, 2159. See also Title III - Wiretapping and Electronic Surveil
lance: Findings, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 801, 82 Stat. 211 (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 253.
187. In re Electronic Evidence, 990 F.2d at 1021-22 (Beam, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 1022. Judge Beam reminded the majority that the cases of the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit require the court to concentrate on language when
interpreting a statute. For example, Judge Beam noted that in the case of In re Erick
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§ 2517(3) may be ambiguous, requiring that the plain meaning of

the statute be ascertained by looking at the specific language of the
statute as well as the specific language and general design of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act as a whole. 189 How
ever, Judge Beam reasoned that, even if this further analysis was
conducted, the majority's interpretation of § 2517(3) as precluding
discovery "stillfails."190 Judge Beam reasoned that the majority's
interpretation failed because it gave too much weight to Congress'
concern for privacy. According to Judge Beam, Congress did not
intend to place the concern for conversational privacy above the
search for truth, which § 2517 encourages by "permitt[ing] use of
wiretap evidence through testimqny given under oath in a 'proceed
ing held under the authority of the United States or of any
State."'191
Judge Beam also criticized Judge Heaney's holding that if
§ 2517(3) allows disclosure of electronic surveillance evidence to
private civil litigants, it allows disclosure only through open testi
mony during the private civil litigant's trial and not in any type of
pretrial proceeding. 192 Judge Beam found no support for this hold
ing in either the language or the legislative history of Title III. Sec
tion 2515 of Title III refers to evidence received "'in any trial,
hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court."'193 In con
trast, § 2517(3), as amended in 1970, involves much broader lan
guage. 194 Section 2517(3) refers to disclosure "while giving
testimony under oath or affirmation in any proceeding held under
the authority of the United States or of any State or political subdi
vision thereof. "195 Judge Beam also reasoned that the Senate Re
port regarding the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act,
which stated that '" [t]he major purpose of Title III [was] to combat
organized crime,'" further illustrates that the majority's holding,
limiting the method of disclosure to private civil litigants to courtson Partnership·, the Eighth Circuit held that "the language of the statute itself must

ordinarily be regarded as conclusive ... [and] when [the court] find[s] the terms of a
statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete." Id. at 1022 (quoting In re Erickson
Partnership, 856 F.2d 1068, 1070 (8th Cir. 1988)}.
189. Id..
190.
191.

192.

Id.
Id. at 1023 (quoting 18 U.S.c. § 2517(3) (1988».
Id.
Id. at 1023 n.4 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1988}) (alteration in original).
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 2517(3} (1988) (emphasis added). See supra note 33 for the text

193.
194.
195.
of § 2517(3}.
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room testimonial disclosure, is incorrect. 196
Finally, Judge Beam criticized the majority for interpreting
§ 2517(3) in a way that effectively restricts the use of wiretap evi
dence "to only those [civil] actions in which the federal govern
ment, a state, or a political subdivision of the state is a party."197 He
stated that neither the language of the statute nor its legislative his
tory qualifies the type of civil action in which disclosure is author
ized. 198 He reasoned that the words used by Congress in the text of
§ 2517(3) are in place to assure that all civil RICO actions are in
cluded, because "[h]ad Congress intended to limit the use' [of testi
monial disclosure] to a 'trial' or a 'hearing' or a 'proceeding'
involving only a governmental party, it could have used such limit
ing words."199 Judge Beam also reasoned that the legislative his
tory of the statute contains no qualification of the type of civil
action involved, despite the fact that Congress could easily have
qualified it.2OO
In addition to Congress' failure to qualify either the language
of § 2517(3) or its legislative history, Judge Beam reasoned that the
majority's holding is erroneous because the Department of Justice
interpreted § 2517 as permitting disclosure of wiretap tapes to pri
vate civil litigants, regardless of goveriunental affiliation.201 Judge
Beam interpreted a'statement by the Department of Justice that it
had no objection to the release of the Lipton-Webbe tapes to Smith
as tantamount to giving the government's approva1. 202 Judge Beam
noted that the United States Supreme Court has held that the Jus
tice Department's interpretation of its own regulations and the stat
utes it administers must be accepted unless such interpretation is

196. In re Electronic Evidence, 990 F.2d at 1024 (Beam, J., dissenting) (quoting S.
REp. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1968), reprinted in 1968, U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112,

2157) (alteration in original).
197. Specifically, the majority interpreted § 2517 as allowing the disclosure of
wiretap evidence only in circumstances involving law enforcement. Id. at 1016-17.
198. Id. at 1024 (Beam, J., dissenting).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. (citing Smith v. Lipton, No. 91-643C(1), slip op. at 8 (E.D. Mo. May 7,
1991». Judge Beam stated that the Justice Department "[o]bviously ... ha[d] inter
preted section 2517 and TItle III as permitting disclosure of the Lipton-Webbe tapes to
private litigants" because the Justice Department had given its approval of the disclo
sure of the tapes to Smith. Id.
202. Id. (citing Appellant's Supp. Brief at 4, In re Electronic Evidence (No. 91
2385».
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"plainly unreasonable. "203
III.

ANALYSIS

Section 2517(3) of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act should be interpreted by courts to authorize disclo
sure of communications, intercepted by the government and not
previously made public, to private civil litigants for use in the pri
vate civil litigants' actions, either before or during trial. The plain
language of § 2517(3), as amended in 1970, by providing for disclo
sure "while giving testimony under oath or affirmation in any pro
ceedingheld under the authority of the United States or of any
State or political subdivision thereof,"204 supports this position.
The legislative history of the statute as originally enacted in 1968
and as amended in 1970 further supports this position, because the
fight to eliminate organized crime through civil as well as criminal
means was an important and focused congressional objective.205 Fi
nally, support for the proposition that § 2517(3), as amended in
1970, authorizes disclosure of intercepted communications to pri
vate civil litigants can be found in the broad and generous discovery
rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.206
A.

Plain Language of Section 2517(3)

Through Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,
Congress amended each title of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968 in order to "strengthen and clarify its pro
visions."207 The language of § 2517(3) as "clarified" is unambigu
ous and plainly allows the disclosure of previously undisclosed
electronic surveillance evidence to private civil litigants before and
during the civil trial, so long as the disclosure occurs while a party
or nonparty is giving testimony under oath.208
The Supreme Court has stated that when interpreting a statute,
courts must focus on plain language, not on legislative history.209
203. Id. at 1024-25 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984».
204. 18 U.S.C. § 2517(3) (1988).
205. S. REp. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2157; Pub. L. No. 91·452, 84 Stat. 922, reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1073, 1073.
206. FED. R. CIY. P. 26·37.
207. H.R REp. No. 1549,. 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1970), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007.
208. See supra note 33 for the text of § 2517(3) as amended in 1970.
209. Burlington N. RR v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 481 U.S. 454, 461 (1987) (in·
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For example, the Court has directed lower courts that "[w]hen con
fronted with a statute which is plain and unambiguous on its face,
[courts] ordinarily do not look to legislative history as a guide to its
meaning ... [because] it is not necessary to look beyond the words
of the statute."210 In such a case, "the language of the statute itself
'must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive. "'211
In interpreting § 2517(3), the Courts of Appeals for both the
Eighth212 and Second213 Circuits have disregarded the Supreme
Court's directive and looked not at the language of § 2517(3), but
to the "legislative struggle leading to its enactment."214 As a result,
these courts have held that § 2517(3) does not authorize pretrial
disclosure to private civil litigants. In In re Electronic Evidence, the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recited Smith's argument
that the amended language of § 2517(3) provides for pretrial disclo
sure of wiretap evidence, but responded with a legislative history
analysis. 215 In National Broadcasting Co. v. United States Depart
ment of Justice, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit con
ceded that an argument for disclosure similar to Smith's argument
in In re Electronic Evidence was plausible if it was based solely on
the language of § 2517(3) but then dismissed the argument because
it did not comport with the legislative history of the statute. 216 If
the Courts of Appeals for the Second and Eighth Circuits had ex
vestigating fifteen year old legislative history of statute is "irrelevant"); United States v.
James, 478 U.S. 597, 606 (1986) (legislative history of statute does not "justif[y] depar
ture from the plain words of the statute"); Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430
(1981) ("when we find the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is com
plete"); Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)
("the familiar canon of statutory construction that [is] the starting point for interpreting
a statute is the language of the statute itself'); Tennessee Yalley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153, 184 n.29 (1978) ("when confronted with a statute which is plain and unambiguous
on its face, we ordinarily do not look to legislative history as a guide to its meaning").
210. Tennessee Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 184 n.29.
211. James, 478 U.S. at 606 (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 447 U.S. at
108).
212. In re Motion to Unseal Electronic Evidence, 990 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1993)
(en banc).
213. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 735 F.2d 51 (2d
Cir.1984).
214. In re Electronic Evidence, 990 F.2d at 1017 (quoting NBC, 735 F.2d at 53).
215. Id. The court in In re Electronic Evidence stated that "[w]e simply allow
Congress's [sic] 'overriding concern for the protection of conversational privacy' ... to
guide our determination that section 2517 does not authorize disclosure in this case."
Id. at 1017 n.3 (quoting In re Electronic Evidence, 965 F.2d 637, 641 (8th Cir. 1992),
vacated, 990 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc».
216. NBC, 735 F.2d at 53-54.
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amined the plain language of the amended § 2517(3)217 more
closely and compared it with the language of the subsection as orig
inally enacted,218 they may have held that § 2517(3) does authorize
pretrial disclosure to private civil litigants.
The statute as originally enacted provided for disclosure of in
tercepted electronic communications "while giving testimony under
oath ... in any criminal proceeding in any court of the United
States;"219 The 1968 language clearly prohibited disclosure in any
proceeding conducted pursuant to a civil action. The statute as
amended in 1970 provides for disclosure "while giving testimony
under oath ... in any proceeding held under the authority of the
United States."220 The current language removed the requirement
of a criminal action. The language also removed the requirement of
a proceeding held before a court by deleting the phrase "in any
court" after the word "proceeding." This alteration makes it possi
ble for such evidence to be disclosed in an out-of-court proceeding,
such as the taking of a deposition during discovery.221
Despite this alteration, courts that have decided the issue have
interpreted "any proceeding" to mean any proceeding that is held
before a judge, such as a pretrial hearing or a trial itself.222 It is the
interpretation of the phrase "any proceeding" that will give courts
the answer to the question of whether section 2517(3) authorizes
disclosure to private civil RICO litigants in a pretrial, non-court
proceeding.
The word "proceeding" is not defined in the earlier sections of
Title III, as is other language included in § 2517(3), such as "per
son"223 and "electronic communication."224 Legal dictionaries de
217. See supra note 33 for the text of § 2517(3) as amended.
218. See supra note 28 and accompanying text for the text of § 2517(3) as origi
nally enacted.
219. 18 u.s.c. § 2517(3) (Supp. IV 1969).
220. § 2517(3) (1988).
221. FED. R. CIv. P. 27-32 govern the taking and use of depositions generally.
The taking of a deposition may be considered an out-of-court proceeding because it
entails the giving of testimony under oath before an authorized officer of the United
States, the state where the deposition is being taken, or the state where the civil action
is pending. FED. R. CIv. P. 28(a).
222. See, e.g., Gardner v. Newsday, Inc., 895 F.2d 74, 77 (2d Cir.) (Section 2517(3)
"relates solely to use in law-enforcement activities and judicial proceedings. "), cert. de
nied, 496 U.S. 931 (1990); United States v. Rosenthal,763 F.2d 1291, 1293 (11th Cir.
1985) (Section 2517(3) "has determined that . . . disclosure in open court is
appropriate. ").
223. 18 U.S.c. § 2510(6) (1988).
224. § 2510(12).
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fine "proceeding" as "any action, hearing, investigation, inquest, or
inquiry ... in which, pursuant to law, testimony can be compelled to
be given."225 Based on this definition, the discovery methods of
deposition taking and production of documents in response to a
subpoena duces tecum226 come within the purview of "any
proceeding. "
B.

Legislative History of Section 2517(3)

When statutory language is ambiguous, courts must look to the
legislative history of the statute to discern its meaning. The Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has stated that courts "must inter
pret [a] statute in light of the purposes Congress sought to serve ...
and legislative history may play an important part in discerning
these purposes."227
The legislative history of § 2517(3) as originally enacted and as
amended further supports the proposition that the statute autho
rizes disclosure of previously undisclosed electronic surveillance ev
idence to private civil litigants before the civil trial begins,
especially private civil RICO litigants. Courts that have decided
the issue of whether the section authorizes disclosure to private civil
litigants have reasoned that, when enacting Title III, Congress' pri
mary concern was to protect the privacy interests of those persons
engaged in wire, oral, land electronic communications; therefore,
Congress could only have intended disclosure of communications
surveillance evidence to the government in civil actions228 or to pri
vate litigants and the public at large after the evidence had been
disclosed publicly in atrial.229
However, protecting the privacy interests of persons engaged
in wire, oral, and electronic communications was not Congress' only
225. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1204 (6th ed. 1990).
226. A subpoena duces tecum is a subpoena "initiated by a party in litigation,
compelling production of certain specific documents and other items," to persons not a
party to the action. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1426 (6th ed. 1990).
227. Sierra Club v. Qark, 755 F.2d 608, 615 (8th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted).
228. See, e.g., In re Motion to Unseal Electronic Surveillance Evidence, 990 F.2d
1015, 1018 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States Dep't
of Justice, 735 F.2d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Dorfman, 690 F.2d 1230, 1233
(7th Cir. 1982). See supra notes 69-83, 140-202 and accompanying text for a discussion
of these cases.
229. See, e.g., United States v. Rosenthal, 763 F.2d 1291, 1293 (11th Cir. 1985);
County of Oakland v. City of Detroit, 610 F. Supp. 364, 368-69 (E.D. Mich. 1984), ap
peal denied sub nom. Oakland County by Kuhn v. Detroit, 762 F.2d 1010 (6th Cir.
1985); Dowd v. Calabrese, 101 F.R.D. 427, 435 (D.D.C. 1984). See supra notes 84-104
and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
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concern in enacting Title III. Another "major purpose of TItle III
[was] to combat organized crime."230 Congress' amendment of TI
tle III in 1970 illustrates its intention to use § 2517(3) to help eradi
cate organized crime. Congress amended TItle III within the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. As evidenced by its name,
the Organized Crime Control Act was enacted to "seek the eradica
tion of organized crime in the United States."231 In passing legisla
tion that provided for civil remedies against organized crime, such
as allowing civil lawsuits for RICO violations, Congress attempted
to further its stated end.
Successful civil RICO actions brought by both the government
and private litigants help to ensure the furtherance of Congress'
stated objective of eliminating organized crime. Granting civil
RICO litigants access to as much relevant evidence as possible, as
early on in the litigation as is practical, helps guarantee the litiga
tion's success. Therefore, § 2517(3), as enacted and amended,
should be interpreted by courts as authorizing the disclosure of
electronic surveillance evidence to private civil RICO litigants
before the trial as well as during the trial.
C.

Discovery Rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Additional support for interpreting § 2517(3) as authorizing
disclosure of previously undisclosed government-acquired elec
tronic surveillance material to private civil RICO litigants before
the civil trial begins can be found in the discovery rules of the Fed
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.232 Congress stated that the purpose
of the discovery rules is to grant civil litigants access to as much
relevant information as possible.233 This ensures that their claim or
defense is properly adjudicated. Granting private civil RICO liti
gants access to electronic surveillance evidence acquired by the
government corresponds to this purpose. Often, such evidence is
the only substantial proof that civil RICO claimants have against an
230. s. REp. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112,2157. Congress was so concerned with combatting organized crime
because "[t]hese hard-core groups hard] become more than just loose associations of
criminals. They hard] developed into corporations of corruption, indeed, quasi-govern
ments within our society ...." Id. Congress acknowledged that the only effective
method of discovering the activities of organized crime was to intercept the communica
tions of organized criminals. Id. at 2159.
231. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1073.
232. FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37.
233. FED. R. CIY. P. 26(b) advisory committee's note.
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alleged RICO offender.234 However, electronic surveillance and
wiretapping can only be conducted by the government pursuant to
Title IIJ.235 Therefore, refusing to disclose electronic surveillance
evidence to the private' civil RICO litigant effectively denies the liti
gant access to one of the more, if not the most, important pieces of
evidence of a RICO violation.
Despite the discovery rules' general language and broad provi
sions to grant civil litigants access to relevant information,236 the
courts that have considered § 2517(3) have refused to interpret it as
authorizing disclosure to private civil litigants during discovery.237
This is because these courts were primarily concenied with protect
ing the privacy of persons engaged in wire, oral, or electronic com
munications. For example, in In re Electronic Evidence, the court
carefully considered Congress' concern for protecting conversa
tional privacy when Title III was originally enacted and concluded
that this concern was not overridden by the language of § 2517(3)
as amended. 238
However, a civil litigant's access to relevant information pursu
ant to the discovery rules does not go unchecked. The discovery
rules contain provisions that address the concerns for the protection
of privacy that so concerned the In re Electronic Evidence court,
while meeting the needs of civil litigants to gather all relevant infor
mation.239 For example, pursuant to Rule 26(b), civil litigants must
show that they have a substantial need for the materials and infor
mation they request from an opposing party or third person that
cannot be met another way.240 In addition, according to Rule 34,
civil litigants must make a showing of good cause in order for the
court to compel the person from whom discovery is sought to pro
234, S, REp, No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112,2159 ("[I]ntercepting the communications of organized criminals is
the only effective method of learning about their activities.").
235. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1988).
236. FED. R. ClY. P. 26(b)(1).
237. United States v. Rosenthal, 763 F.2d 1291 (11th Cir. 1985); National Broad
casting Co. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 735 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v.
Dorfman, 690 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. 1982); County of Oakland v. City of Detroit, 610 F.
Supp. 364 (E.D. Mich. 1984), appeal denied sub nom. Oakland County by Kuhn v. De
troit, 762 F.2d 1010 (6th Cir. 1985). See supra notes I.C for a discussion of these cases.
238. In re Motion to Unseal Electronic Surveillance Evidence, 990 F.2d 1015,
1018 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc). See supra part II.C for a discussion of the en banc
opinion.
239. FED. R. ClY. P. 26(b)(3) & (c).
240. FED. R. ClY. P. 26(b)(3).
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duce documents and tangible objects.241 Though vacated by the en
banc opinion one year later, the In re Electronic Evidence panel
opinion's test for disclosing electronic surveillance evidence to pri
vate civil litigants, as articulated by Judge Beam, provides a model
that balances the privacy of persons engaged in communications
with a civil litigant's need for informa~6n.242 'Judge Beam's test re
quired that a private civil, RIGa litigant articulate a compelling
need that could not be "accommodated by any other means" before
the court would order the disclosure of wiretap evidence in the pos
session of the government.243 The test directed the court deciding
whether to allow disclosure to "conduc~ an in camera inspection of
the intercepted communications to evaluate whether a compelling
need exists."244
A second provision of the discovery rules that addresses the
privacy concerns of the In re Electronic Evidence court can be
found in Rule 2p(c),245 which authorizes a court to issue a protec
tive order when necessary to prevent a party or person from whom
discovery is sought from "annoyance, embarrassment, oppression,
or undue burden or expense."246 In his test, Judge Beam similarly
provided protection for privacy rights with a discretionary protec
tive order.247 The final portion of Judge Beam's test directed a dis
trict court deciding upon disclosure to issue protective orders "as it
deems appropriate. "248 The protective order allows a court to limit
discovery requests to specific information or persons or to author
ize a person from whom discovery is sought to refuse to submit to
the request. 249
Such limitation on the ability of private civil RICO litigants to
gain access to electronically recorded conversations and informa
tion would ensure that civil RICO litigants gain access to no more
information than is necessary to properly adjudicate their claims,
241. FED, R. CIY. P. 34.
242. See supra note 129 and accompanying text for Judge Beam's five-part bal
ancing test.
243. In re Motion to Unseal Electronic Surveillance Evidence, 965 F.2d 637, 642
(8th Cir. 1992), vacated, 990 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1993) (en bane).
244. [d.
245. FED. R. CIY. P. 26(c).
246. Id.
247. In re Electronic Evidence, 965 F.2d at 642. See supra note 129 and accompa
nying text for Judge Beam's five-part balancing test.
248. Id.
249. FED. R. CIY. P. 26(e).
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while persons engaged in wire, oral, or electronic communications
maintain their privacy.
CONCLUSION

The right to privacy is a basic right recognized by the judiciary
and the legislature as worthy of protection. Individuals who engage
in confidential communications with others are 'especially afforded
protection of that right. However, when the communications be
tween individuals concern illegal activity, such as violations of
RICO laws, the government has the right to intercept those com
munications and disclose them at pUblic criminal or civil trials.
To date, whenever private civil litigants have attempted to gain
access, during the discovery phase of their litigation, to such com
munications obtained by the government, courts have refused to
allow it, citing § 2517(3) of TItle III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968 as prohibiting such disclosure. These
courts, however, have erred in their interpretation of § 2517(3).
Section 2517(3)'s plain language, its legislative history, and the
much embraced public policy of ascertaining the truth all interact to
authorize disclosure of intercepted communications to private civil
RICO litigants either before or during trial.
Lori K. Odierna

